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Judgment and the Identity Theory of Truth 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The correspondence theorist of truth conceives of thought as separate from reality and of truth as 
consisting in a match between the two.  The identity theorist disagrees: thought is answerable to 
reality for its truth – if a thought is true, this is because of the content of reality – but there is not the 
gap here that the correspondence theorist imagines.  This disagreement has taken the shape of a 
disagreement over facts.  According to a traditional correspondence theory, facts are those elements 
of external reality by which thoughts are measured: for a thought to be true is for it to correspond to 
a fact.  The identity theory agrees that facts are elements of reality but denies that they are  external 
to thought.  Rather, a fact is a possible object of thought, it is something a subject may think, and 
thoughts – that is, thinkings – contain their objects. 
The identity theorist’s conception of facts as thinkables can be elaborated in more than one 
way.  In this paper I shall consider two elaborations, one offered by Jennifer Hornsby and a second 
deriving from the Tractarian Wittgenstein and Ramsey.  Hornsby’s conception of a thinkable, and so 
of a fact, is informed by her adoption of the dual relation theory of judgment.  As a result, I shall 
argue, she faces two significant problems regarding thought’s answerability to reality.  On the one 
hand a difficulty arises of how the content of reality is to be such that a thought could answer to it, 
and on the other there is a problem of how answerability can be possible without relapsing towards 
the correspondence theory.  The Ramseyan version of the identity theory recommended in this 
paper involves, by contrast, a rejection of the dual relation theory of judgment and is not subject to 
either of the problems discussed. 
 
 
2  Opposing the Correspondence Theory 
 
As I shall understand it, the identity theory of truth has as its centrepiece an identification of 
thinkables – that is, possible objects of thought – and facts.  The content of this identification lies, in 
part, in its opposition to the correspondence theory of truth. 
 
2.1 
We think, or say, that p.  But how are we to characterise the that p here?  How are we to 
characterise what is thought or said in such an episode of thinking or saying, the object of the 
thinking or saying?  McDowell writes: 
 
When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case.  ... One can think, for instance, that 
spring has begun, and that very same thing, that spring has begun, can be the case.  (McDowell 
1994 p27) 
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A thinkable – that p – is something that can be the case: it can be the case that p.  So much, for the 
identity theorist, is mere truism.  It is a truism, furthermore, they want to recast.   For the recasting, 
notice that the notion of being the case is readily aligned with that of a fact.  So Wittgenstein, for 
example, writes: 
 
The world divides into facts.  Any one can either be the case or not be the case. (Wittgenstein 
1922 §§1.2-1.21). 
 
The alignment can be made in two ways.  One could straightforwardly identify a fact with something 
that can be the case.  Or one could call something a fact only if it is the case.  Both uses of the word 
are, I take it, perfectly legitimate.  We no more hesitate to understand Wittgenstein when he 
identifies the totality of facts with everything that is the case (Wittgenstein 1922 §§1-1.1) than it 
crosses our mind to think he has only true representations in view when he writes that “we picture 
facts to ourselves” (Wittgenstein 1922 §2.1).  ‘It is a fact that p’ entails ‘p’; but we speak also of non-
obtaining facts.  For reasons of simplicity and clarity only, I shall run with the ‘non-factive’ use of the 
word ‘fact’.1  McDowell’s (putative) truism is thus recast as the claim that a thinkable is a fact.  
 
2.2 
This identification of fact and thinkable stands in opposition to the correspondence theory of truth.  
In its simplest form, the correspondence theory holds that a thinking is true if, and only if, there 
exists a fact corresponding to it.  On such a theory, facts would be external to thinkings – and so 
would not be the objects of thinkings.  This opposition is no accident: it is a central ambition of the 
identity theorist to reject the correspondence theory.  Clarification of the matter may be had by 
considering a second characterisation of thinkables. 
 McDowell, again, writes: 
 
The basis of the truth-conditional conception of meaning, as I see it, is the following thought: to 
specify what would be asserted, in the assertoric utterance of a sentence apt for such use, is to 
specify a condition under which the sentence (as thus uttered) would be true.  (McDowell 1998 
p88) 
 
If I were to utter the sentence ‘Snow is white’ assertorically, what I would assert is that snow is 
white, and just this, that snow is white, would be the condition of the truth of the sentence so 
uttered.  (More simply, the sentence ‘Snow is white’ has as its truth condition that snow is white.)  
Again with thinkings: my thought that Jack loves Jill has as the condition of its truth precisely what I 
there think – that Jack loves Jill.  
This characterisation of assertables/thinkables as truth conditions can, I think, be taken as 
uncontentious common ground between the identity and correspondence theorists.  Both parties 
agree that a judgment has a truth condition – that p – which belongs (essentially) to the judgment.  
From here, the theories diverge.  The identity theorist, in identifying both thinkables and facts and 
                                                          
1
 As Wittgenstein later puts it: ‘I can … make the stipulation that I will only use the words ‘fact’, ‘act’ … in a 
proposition which, when complete, asserts that this fact obtains.  It would be better to drop the restriction on 
the use of these words, since it only leads to confusion, and say quite happily: ‘This act was never performed’, 
‘This fact does not obtain’. (Wittgenstein 1974 p77) 
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thinkables and truth conditions, identifies truth conditions and facts.  The fact that Jack loves Jill is 
the truth condition of my belief that Jack loves Jill.  The simple correspondence theorist, on the 
other hand, imagines a quite different role for facts.  A fact is not a truth condition but rather an 
item whose existence constitutes the obtaining of a truth condition – it is truth-maker.  The fact that 
Jack loves Jill is not the truth condition of my belief that Jack loves Jill: it is, rather, an entity whose 
existence constitutes the obtaining of that truth condition and so the truth of my belief. 
 
2.3 
The identity theorist wants to oppose rather more, however, than just the simple correspondence 
theory.  Indeed, to understand fully that particular opposition, we need to place it in the context of a 
broader and deeper stance against correspondence theories more generally.  At root, the identity 
theorist’s concern is not with the nature or role of facts – with whether, say, facts are to be taken as 
truth-makers or as truth conditions.  The identity theorist’s root concern, rather, is to reject the idea, 
basic to the correspondence theory in all its versions, that a judgment is something which is separate 
from reality and whose truth consists in a match with reality. 
Hornsby, following McDowell, describes the correspondence theorist as positing an 
‘ontological gap’ between thought and reality (Hornsby 1997 p1).  On one side of the gap are 
judgments and on the other is reality; truth then consists in a match between the two.  And it is in 
opposition to this supposed gap that Hornsby and McDowell locate reality – obtaining facts – inside 
thoughts.  Reality is not an external object of comparison/assessment for thought; rather, as 
Wittgenstein writes, ‘when we say, mean, that something is the case, we do not stop with what we 
mean anywhere short of the fact’ (Wittgenstein 1953 §95).  Or in another favoured quote: thought 
‘reaches right out to reality’ (Wittgenstein 1922 §2.1511). 
This root opposition to the correspondence theory more generally may be sharpened up as 
before with the notion of a truth condition.  The correspondence theorist’s gap between thought 
and reality is the idea that, given a thought with its truth condition, there remains a question of 
what it is for the world to match that truth condition, a question of what is it for the world to be 
such that the truth condition obtains.  Perhaps the obtaining of the truth condition consists in the 
existence of a fact, or perhaps some rather different account is to be given, one which doesn’t speak 
of facts or even of existence.  To offer some such account of the obtaining of a truth condition, 
however, is to be a correspondence theorist in the broad sense in view.  The identity theorist’s 
rejection of the correspondence theorist’s gap then consists, from this perspective, in their rejection 
of the propriety such theorising.  No account is to be offered of the obtaining of a truth condition by 
reference to an external reality.  Rather, the truth condition is – if it obtains – already reality, and so 
its obtaining or non-obtaining is brute.2  As Russell puts it, some truth conditions obtain and some do 
not ‘just as some roses are red and some white’ (Russell 1904 p523). 
 
2.4 
To close the section, note that we can see in these last few remarks the principal reasons for and 
against using the word ‘fact’ factively.  If facts are identified with truth conditions in general then 
reality cannot be, or include, the totality of facts: it must rather be the totality of obtaining facts – 
and this is slightly clumsy.  The restriction is necessary because it is a principal task of reality, as that 
                                                          
2
 No more account is to be offered of a truth condition’s obtaining or non-obtaining than is offered by the 
simple correspondence theorist of the existence of non-existence of her facts.  In both cases the philosophical 
theorist, having reached reality, stops theorising. 
4 
 
notion is commonly conceived by philosophers, to explain judgments’ truth, and if all facts, obtaining 
or otherwise, were a part of reality, then this task would not be achieved (more on this below).  
Telling in favour of a non-factive use of ‘fact’, on the other hand, is that if one were to use the word 
‘fact’ for obtaining truth conditions only and then ‘fiction’, say, for non-obtaining truth conditions, 
someone might reasonably respond by asking what the difference is between the two, what account 
is to be given of a thinkable’s being a fact as opposed to a fiction.  Calling all thinkables facts, as I 
shall, discourages this question, implicitly suggesting from the top that one is not interested in 
offering a theory of the obvious division within the category.  But to repeat, this is a purely 
terminological preference.  Nothing changes in the discussion above or to follow if, when speaking of 
the identity theory, the word ‘fact’ is replaced every time by ‘fact or fiction’. 
 
 
3 Two Conceptions of Thinkables 
 
The identification of facts and thinkables can be elaborated in more than one way depending on 
how thought, and so how the objects of thought, is conceived.  This section contrasts two 
conceptions of thought and considers in outline how those conceptions lead to different versions of 
the identity theory. 
 
3.1 
Ramsey asserts in his 1927 paper ‘Facts and Propositions’ that once a theory of judgment has been 
given – a theory that is of the possession of a truth condition – there remains no further problem of 
truth, no further problem of the obtaining of a truth condition: 
 
It is, perhaps, also immediately obvious that if we have analysed judgment we have solved the 
problem of truth. … [All that] we have to explain is the meaning of saying that the judgment is a 
judgment that a has R to b, i.e. is true if aRb, false if not.  (Ramsey 1990 p158)  
 
This claim that there is no ‘separate problem of truth’ (p157) to the problem of judgment, as Ramsey 
puts it a page earlier, should sound familiar.  It’s worth emphasising in passing that Ramsey does 
indeed say ‘separate problem of truth’ and not simply ‘problem of truth’.    Ramsey’s position is not 
that there is no problem of truth, but rather that the problem of truth is the problem of judgment – 
the problem, that is, of what it is to be true if p, false if not.  We should hesitate, I thus quickly 
suggest, to see Ramsey as a deflationist.  But rather than take that exegetical point on directly, let’s 
consider judgment. 
Ramsey’s paper opens with a Russellian distinction between dual and multiple relation 
theories of judgment.  Judgment, according to the dual relation theory, is a relation between a 
subject (or ‘mental factors’) and a single entity judged.  According to the multiple relation theory, on 
the other hand, judgment is a multiple relation between a subject (or ‘mental factors’) and several 
separate entities – between, that is, a subject and those entities which would on the dual relation 
theory have been the constituents of the single entity judged.  This contrast is, of course, highly 
schematic.  It is not without content, however; in particular, the two options carry divergent 
implications for how thinkables are to be conceived. 
The dual relation theory holds, as said, that belief is a dual relation between a subject and a 
single entity.  That single entity will then be the object of the belief, the thinkable there believed.  It 
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follows on such an account, then, that thinkables are existing entities.  The relatum of a relation is an 
entity, an object, whose existence is a precondition of the relation’s obtaining.  And so the thinkable 
that p is, according to the dual relation theory, an entity whose existence is a precondition of judging 
that p.  The multiple relation theory, on the other hand, has the consequence that thinkables are not 
entities.   A judgment, according to the multiple relation theory, is a relation not to a single item but 
rather to several separate entities, and so there is no entity belonging to the judgment which is a 
candidate for being the thinkable there thought.  If pushed on what an object of judgment is to be if 
not an entity, a multiple relation theorist might add that a thinkable is not a thing but rather a ‘way 
things may be’; it is not an entity but a possibility.  More concretely, it will be held that talk of the 
existence of a thinkable does not specify a precondition of judgment; rather, ‘The thinkable that p 
exists’ will, if it means anything at all, most likely mean simply that p. 
 
3.2 
The identity theory of truth does not in itself carry any straightforward commitment to either the 
dual or multiple relation theory of judgment.3   So where Hornsby and the early Russell, for example, 
combine the identity theory with the dual relation theory, Wittgenstein and Ramsey, I shall suggest, 
are multiple relation identity theorists.  As can be seen, however, the identity theory does take on 
rather different forms depending upon which theory of judgment is preferred.  Let’s pursue this 
point a little further. 
  First, consider truth-bearers.  Ramsey writes: 
 
According to some philosophers we apply [the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’] to ‘propositions’, which 
are the objects of judgments and the meanings of sentences, but themselves neither 
judgments nor sentences.   
According to the philosophers who believe in them, it is these propositions which are 
true or false in the most fundamental sense, a belief being called true or false by an extension 
of meaning according as what is believed is a true or a false proposition.  But in as much as the 
existence of such things is generally (and to my mind rightly) doubted, it seems best to begin 
not with them but with the mental states of which they are the supposed objects and to 
discuss the terms true and false in their application to these mental states. (Ramsey 2001 
p434) 
 
If to judge that p is to be related to a single thinkable-entity, then that entity must play a central role 
in the explanation of the judgment’s truth value.  And the obvious central role for it to play is that of 
conferring its own truth value on the judgment.  Thus the dual relation theorist will most likely call 
thinkables propositions and take them to be the primary truth bearers.  If, on the other hand, one 
follows Ramsey in rejecting the dual relation theory, and so rejects that there are such things as 
thinkables, then one will focus instead on judgments – mental states and sentences – as the bearers 
of the property of truth. 
                                                          
3
 One could object (-people have-) that identity is a relation and so if the identity theory of truth involves an 
identification of thinkables and facts it thereby involves treating thinkables as entities.  The objection is 
misguided.  The identity theory of truth is not some claim of the form ‘x=y’ – it is rather the theoretical 
position that, as I put it, no account is to be offered of the obtaining of a truth condition by reference to an 
external reality, for the truth condition is – if it obtains – already reality, and so its obtaining or non-obtaining 
is brute. 
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This disagreement over truth bearers evinces, we can briefly note, a broader divergence in 
‘vision’ of truth.  Truth for the multiple relation theorist is a property of representations, whether 
mental or linguistic, and is indeed a species of representational correctness.   For the dual relation 
identity theorist, on the other hand, truth is a property in the first instance of thinkables, and 
thinkables are not representations – they are rather what representations represent: facts.  
(Thinkables are not items with truth conditions: they are truth conditions.)  Thus whilst the multiple 
relation theorist will hold, with the 1910 Russell, that ‘there would be no truth and falsehood if there 
were no minds’, the dual relation identity theorist takes truth to be a mind-independent property of 
mind-independent entities.4 
A second notable point of difference between the dual and multiple relation identity 
theorists, one touched on just above, concerns such sentences as ‘The fact/proposition/truth 
condition that p exists/is true/obtains’.  Where the dual relation theorist will see reference made 
here to a thinkable entity which is then said to exist or to have the property of truth or of obtaining, 
the multiple relation theorist will provide a quite different account.  More particularly, they will most 
likely see the sentences simply as periphrases of ‘p’.  Thus Ramsey, taking a swipe at the 
correspondence theory, writes: 
 
We can, if we like, say that [a judgment that aRb] is true if there exists a corresponding fact 
that a has R to b, but this is essentially not an analysis but a periphrasis, for "the fact that a has 
R to b exists" is no different from "a has R to b". (Ramsey 1990 p158-9) 
 
And in a similar vein: 
 
“it is true that Caesar was murdered” means no more than that Caesar was murdered, and “it 
is false that Caesar was murdered” means that Caesar was not murdered.  (Ramsey 1990 
p157) 
 
We can equally imagine Ramsey asserting that “the truth condition that p obtains” is no different 
from “p”.  These sentences are, of course, only the tip of the iceberg: there is a wide family of 
sentences (including, e.g., “Jack and Jill thought the same thing”) of which the dual and multiple 
relation theorists will give divergent accounts.  It is not however the concern of this paper to pursue 
this matter in any detail.  Let’s end the section by noting, rather, that in rejecting the idea that facts 
are existents – in either rejecting or analysing away talk of the existence of thinkables – the multiple 
relation identity theorist puts a wedge between the notions of reality and existence.  Reality – that 
to which thought is answerable – is commonly thought of as a totality of existents.  But the multiple 
relation identity theorist will hold both that reality is, or includes, the totality of ways things are, and 
also that to say that a certain way things are exists will, if it means anything at all, mean only that 
things are indeed that way. 
 
 
4  A Problem of Falsity 
                                                          
4
 There is a point of possible concern here for the dual relation identity theorist – a concern whose first 
expression would be to suggest that the notion of a true fact is genuine misnomer as opposed to harmless 
tautology.  The matter can’t be taken further in this paper, however – though it connects into the discussion of 
section 5 below. 
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There are two significant problems faced by a dual relation identity theorist neither of which takes a 
grip for an identity theorist who conceives of facts as ways things may be.  Both problems may be 
found, in germ, in Russell and Ramsey’s reasons for rejecting the dual relation theory.  This section 
discusses the first of these two, a problem of falsity. 
 
4.1 
In 1910 Russell argues against the view that ‘every judgment, whether true or false, consists in a 
certain relation, called "judging" or "believing", to a single object, which is what we judge or believe’ 
(Russell 1992 p118).  He writes: 
 
Assuming that there are such objects, let us, following Meinong, give them the name 
‘Objectives’. … . So long as we only consider true judgments, the view that they have Objectives 
is plausible ... .  But what is the Objective of the judgment “Charles I died in his bed”?  (Russell 
1992 pp.118-9) 
 
And again: 
 
If we allow that all judgments have Objectives, we shall have to allow that there are Objectives 
which are false. Thus there will be in the world entities, not dependent upon the existence of 
judgments, which can be described as objective falsehoods.  (Russell 1992 p119) 
 
This, Russell thinks, is considerably implausible.  Ramsey concurs with Russell’s opinion, speaking 
somewhat later, but with reference to Russell, of ‘the incredibility of the existence of such objects as 
“that Caesar died in his bed”, which could be described as objective falsehoods’ (Ramsey 1990 p153-
4). 
 To be clear, the target of Russell and Ramsey’s discussions is not simply the dual relation 
theory but rather the combination of that theory with the position that a judgment’s ‘objective’  
belongs to the world – it is a fact, or if we use that word more sparingly, it is a fact-or-fiction.  The 
target, that is to say, is a dual relation identity theory.  And the complaint is straightforward.  The 
dual relation identity theorist has common ground with the simple correspondence theorist in that 
both parties conceive of facts as existing entities.  (As Strawson would disparagingly put it, both 
parties conceive of facts as ‘chunks of reality’ (Strawson 1950 p153).)  But once the identity theorist 
has gone that far with the correspondence theory, it’s unclear how to avoid going all the way and 
conceiving of facts as truth-makers, as entities that exist only in case of truth.  If I think that Charles I 
died in his bed, then on the dual relation identity theory there must exist such a fact-entity as that 
Charles I died in his bed.  But this in turn entails – surely – that Charles I died in his bed. 
 
4.2 
As Ramsey and Russell give it, this is argument by incredulous stare.  How can there exist such a fact-
entity as that Charles I died in his bed when he actually died on the scaffold?  And as sharp as the 
8 
 
stare may be, it allows, dialectically, for a brazening out.  Indeed, Hornsby implicitly does just this.5 A 
recasting is possible, however, which doesn’t allow for such a short response. 
It was mentioned in passing above that it is a principal task of reality, as that idea is 
commonly conceived by philosophers, to explain judgments’ truth.  If my belief is true, this is 
explained by the content of reality.  And the point made briefly on the heels of that observation was 
that if reality is to be up to this task, the identity theorist cannot have it include both obtaining and 
non-obtaining truth conditions.  If reality includes both that Jack loves Jill and that Jack does not love 
Jill, then it is unclear at best how it might explain the truth of my belief that Jack loves Jill.  Hornsby, I 
think, recognises this point and so follows McDowell in echoing Wittgenstein’s dictum that the world 
is a constellation of facts (Wittgenstein 1922 §1.1, Hornsby 1997 p2) – where by ‘fact’ she means, 
like Wittgenstein here, an obtaining truth condition.  But how, one might wonder, is Hornsby 
entitled to this Wittgensteinian identification of the world?  If fictions (non-obtaining truth 
conditions) exist just as well as facts, then on what grounds are they being excluded from reality?  
Reality is, for Hornsby, a totality of existents, so how is it, given that they both exist, that facts are 
included in reality but fictions excluded?  The dual relation identity theorist cannot, I think, brazen 
this out: a significant response is demanded.  Either the idea must be rejected of a reality whose 
content explains judgments’ truth, or it must be explained how certain existing items but not others 
– facts but not fictions – get to count as belonging to reality. 
The former option is of course perfectly possible – and one thinks here of Frege.  To make 
this move is, however, to shift the game substantially.  First, it dialectically weakens the identity 
theorist’s repudiation of the correspondence theory.  The desire to make good on an idea that 
thought answers to reality is, I take it, a principal motivation of the correspondence theory; if the 
idea is rejected rather than accommodated then the correspondence theorist may decide to stop 
listening.  Second, and relatedly, the content of one’s position as an identity theorist becomes 
somewhat thinner.  The identification of fact and thinkable as we understood it above had two arms.  
On one side it included the negative stance that there are no facts other than thinkables: 
philosophical theorising with a notion of fact categorially distinct from thinkable is misguided.  And 
                                                          
5
 Indeed, she misreads Russell and fails even to recognise a problem here.  In response to Russell’s remarks on 
falsity Hornsby writes: 
Moore and Russell can both be read as abandoning an identity theory of truth as a consequence of 
coming to believe that it rendered falsehood totally unaccountable.  ... I believe that Russell’s difficulty 
with falsehood stemmed from his (non-Fregean) account of the unity of propositions, which made it 
impossible for a proposition to be both unified and untrue. (Footnote: According to Russell, what makes 
the proposition that Rab a unity is the fact that R relates a and b.)  (Hornsby 1999 p244) 
Russell’s problem of falsity for his 1903 theorising, Hornsby suggests, depends upon a certain view of the 
constitution of thinkables.  More particularly, it depends upon thinkables being constituted in the manner of 
the early Russell and not in the manner of Frege.  Fregean dual relation identity theorists such as herself face 
no problem here.  This suggestion is, however, a misreading of the texts.  It is certainly true that Russell is 
reacting in 1910 against his own earlier version of the dual relation theory.  It is also true the early Russell took 
thinkables to be constituted rather differently from Frege; where in 1903 Russell took the thinkable that Jack 
loves Jill to be a complex object composed of Jack, love and Jill, Frege has it composed of elements of sense.  
And it is further true that this difference between Frege and the early Russell means that there is a problem of 
falsity faced only by Russell.  How, one may ask the early Russell, can Jack love and Jill be unified into a 
complex whole if Jack does not love Jill?  But all this granted, it remains implausible that this ‘unity’ problem is 
the problem Ramsey and the 1910 Russell are finding for the dual relation theory.  One cannot so much as give 
a first pass statement of this problem without speaking of the entities Jack, love and Jill being united into a 
thinkable – but neither Russell nor Ramsey mention what the thinkable’s constituents might be.  The problem 
Russell presents here, I take it, turns rather on what Russell and Ramsey do speak of: the idea that thinkables 
are existing objects. 
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on the other side – and partially justifying the negative stance – it involves the positive position that 
thinkables are nothing less than facts: nothing less, that is, than elements of reality.  If, however, we 
reject the idea of a reality to which thought answers, then the content of this second arm comes 
under threat: of what reality are thinkables now to be elements?  The identity theorist’s position, 
the worry would then be, will lose much of its interest, becoming little more than a negative stance, 
not easily justified in its generality, against non-thinkable facts. 
As noted, however, Hornsby’s appeal to Wittgenstein’s non-Fregean notion of  ‘world’ 
seems clearly and reassuringly to imply that she does not want to take this route.6  Her problem is 
thus to justify her identification of the world as the totality of (obtaining) facts.  (Without 
justification the identification will be mere stipulation, and a merely stipulated totality won’t do any 
explanatory work; in particular, it won’t explain the truth of my judgment.) 
 
4.3 
There is, by contrast, no problem of falsity for the identity theorist who conceives of thinkables as 
ways things may be there – no problem, that is, of having reality include obtaining truth conditions 
only.  Such a theorist does not face a question of existence pushing both obtaining and non-
obtaining thinkables towards a common status in reality.  Rather, thinkables form a space of 
possibilities – truth conditions – amongst which some are realised: and the realised possibilities, the 
actualities, constitute the world.  As Wittgenstein puts it: ‘The facts in logical space are the world’ 
(Wittgenstein 1922 §1.13).7 
 
 
5  A Problem of Explaining Truth 
 
The problem of falsity for the dual relation identity theorist is a problem of how reality is to be such 
that thought could answer to it.  The second problem I want to consider grants for purposes of 
argument that reality contains obtaining truth conditions only.  Even with this in place, the further 
problem then runs, it is unclear how the dual relation identity theorist can, consistently with her 
intentions as an identity theorist, make good on answerability. 
 
5.1 
Ramsey summarises Russell’s 1910 arguments against his earlier 1903 dual relation identity theory 
as follows: 
 
Let us begin with the objective factor or factors [in a judgment]; the simplest view is that there 
is one such factor only, a proposition, which may be either true or false, truth and falsity being 
                                                          
6
 It is, I however think, the option Julian Dodd implicitly takes in his book (Dodd 2000).  Indeed, the reason 
Dodd’s book is not discussed in this paper is that he is not concerned there with the idea of thought’s 
answerability to reality. 
7
 One might be tempted to respond that the realised and unrealised possibilities spoken of here must 
nonetheless themselves must have some common status in reality – they must all be real possibilities, in some 
sense – and so the problem sticks also for the multiple relation identity theorist.  Faced with such an objection, 
the multiple relation identity theorist would doubt that any content has been given to the word ‘real’. Looking 
to Wittgenstein, logical space is precisely not to be thought of as having a boundary outside which lie ‘non-real 
(impossible) possibilities’ (‘such-and-such possibilities are real, but not such-and-such others’).  The notion of a 
possibility is not in this way contrastive. 
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unanalysable attributes.  This was at one time the view of Mr. Russell, and in his essay, “On 
the Nature of Truth and Falsehood,” he explains the reasons which led him to abandon it.  
These were, in brief, the incredibility of the existence of such objects as “that Caesar died in 
his bed,” which could be described as objective falsehoods, and the mysterious nature of the 
difference, on this theory, between truth and falsehood.  He therefore concluded, in my 
opinion rightly, that a judgment had no single object, but was a multiple relation of the mind 
or mental factors to many objects.  (Ramsey 1990 pp.153-4) 
 
We’ve considered the problem of incredible objective falsehoods; let’s turn now to the mysterious 
nature of the difference between truth and falsehood.  
The complaint here is not quite that on Russell’s early theory truth and falsity were brute 
properties of propositions.  It can’t be quite that because Ramsey rejects in this paper that there are 
such things as propositions.  ‘It is true that p’ means nothing other than that p, ‘it is false that p’ 
nothing other than that not-p, and the last thing Ramsey would press for is would press for is an 
account of the difference between Jack’s loving Jill and his not loving Kate.  So the complaint must 
rather be – as context confirms – that Russell’s 1903 theory makes the difference between true and 
false judgment mysterious.  But what complaint is that? What sort of an explanation of this 
difference are Ramsey and the 1910 Russell after?  Well, it is clear in both texts that what they want 
is an explanation by reference to, as we’ve put it, the content of reality.  Whether my judgment is 
true or false must depend upon ‘the world’.  We considered above that if the world contains too 
much, if it contains non-obtaining facts as well as obtaining facts, such an explanation will not be 
forthcoming.  Excluding non-obtaining facts from reality is, however, only a precondition of an 
explanation.  With this precondition in place, one still needs that what is included in reality – 
obtaining truth conditions – does some explaining.  Specifically, one needs it to be the case that if 
Jack loves Jill, then just this – that Jack loves Jill – explains the truth of my judgment that Jack loves 
Jill.8 
 
5.2 
The 1903 Russell endorses no such explanation.  The truth of a judgment that Jack loves Jill, he held, 
is a matter of the truth of the proposition judged.  But the truth of the proposition judged was in 
turn neither equated with, nor taken to be explained by, Jack’s loving Jill.  It was not equated with 
Jack’s loving Jill because Russell’s dual relation theory had propositions down as objects, and such an 
object having the property of truth is a different matter from Jack and Jill being related by love.  And 
it was not explained by Jack’s loving Jill because it was not explained by anything.  As Ramsey 
emphasises in making his complaint, truth and falsehood are, for Russell, brute ‘unanalysable 
attributes’ of proposition-entities. 
 Why this bruteness?  Well, recall that it was taken in section 2 above to be a part of the 
identity theory’s essential opposition to the correspondence theory that it refuses to provide an 
account of the difference between obtaining and non-obtaining truth conditions.  The reason for this 
was straightforward: in holding that truth conditions, if they obtain, are already reality, the identity 
theorist rejects that there is anything else, any ‘further reality’, by reference to which their obtaining 
or non-obtaining might be explained.  Thus, as Russell had it, some truth conditions obtain and some 
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 Or as Aristotle had it: ‘It is not because we think that you are white, that you are white, but because you are 
white we who say this have the truth’ (Aristotle 1984 1051b 6-8). 
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do not, ‘just as some roses are red and some white’ (Russell 1904 p523).  The fuller quote from 
Russell, however, is that ‘some propositions are true and some false just as some roses are red and 
some white.’  And the point of remarking this here is that these two claims are, of course, the same; 
I wasn’t misquoting Russell.  For a dual relation identity theorist – a theorist who takes thinkables to 
be the primary truth bearers – no separation is available of the truth of the thinkable that p from its 
obtaining.9  So not to give an account of the difference between thinkable obtaining and non-
obtaining is precisely not to give an account of the difference between thinkable truth and falsity. 
 Hornsby, it may thus seem, will have to agree with the 1903 Russell that thinkable truth and 
falsity to be brute, and so follow him to the unwelcome conclusion that the truth of my judgment 
that Jack loves Jill is not explained by Jack’s loving Jill.10  Interestingly, though, this is not what 
happens.  Whilst Hornsby agrees with Russell that judgment truth is a matter of propositional truth, 
she rejects that propositional truth is brute.  Rather, the truth of the proposition that Jack loves Jill – 
and so the truth of my judgment – is explained by, precisely, the fact that Jack loves Jill.  Hornsby, 
this is to say, agrees, as an identity theorist must, that the truth of a thinkable is not explained by 
any further reality.  There is no reality beyond the thinkable to which appeal might be made here.  
But the conclusion that thinkable truth must therefore be brute is, she implies, too hasty.  Rather, 
the truth of a thinkable is explained by the thinkable itself.  Appealing as this proposal may seem, it 
does not, I want now to press, represent a happy way for the dual relation identity theorist to have 
thought answerable to reality.  In particular, I want to suggest that Hornsby’s position here threatens 
to push her towards the correspondence theory in a manner with which she should be considerably 
uncomfortable, given her ambitions in offering an identity theory. 
 
5.3 
It is clear enough why Hornsby would want to claim that if the proposition that p is true, this is 
because p.  Without this she is left with the early Russell unable to say that if my judgment that p is 
true this is because p, and so unable to endorse the idea that thought answers to reality.  How 
though is the claim to be substantiated?  Addressing this question, Hornsby compares the 
relationship between ‘The thinkable that a is F is true’ and ‘a is F’ with that between ‘{a} has a 
member that is F’ and ‘a is F’.  Much as a’s being F explains {a}’s having a member that is F, so too it 
explains the thinkable that a is F’s being true.  Her leading idea here is that the proposition’s being 
true, like the set’s having a member that is F, ‘requires something more than a’s being F’ (Hornsby 
2005 p44) – and this something more constitutes the explanatory asymmetry.   Substituting ‘The 
rose is red’ for ‘a is F’ she writes: 
 
For the rose to be red, it isn’t required that there should be anything meaningful to say or to 
think; in particular it isn’t required that the proposition that the rose is red should be 
propounded.  Again, for the rose to be red it isn’t required that one should be able to speak or 
to think of a set whose sole member is the rose.  (Hornsby 2005 pp.43-4) 
 
                                                          
9
 One could try, perhaps, for something like: the thinkable’s truth is constituted by, rather than identical to, its 
obtaining, but transparently there is no material available to the theorist with which to substantiate such a 
claim. 
10
 As Russell writes in 1910: if we ‘adhere to the opinion that there are both true and false Objectives we shall 
be compelled to regard it as an ultimate and not further explicable fact that Objectives are of two sorts, the 
true and the false’ (Russell 1992 p119). 
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{a}’s having a member which is F requires something more than a’s being F: it requires that the 
singleton {a} should exist.  Similarly, ‘its being the case that [the proposition that p] is true requires 
more (in the sense elicited) than that p should be the case’ (p44): it requires that there should be 
such a proposition as that p. 
 How, one however wonders, does the ‘The proposition that p is true’ say more than ‘p’?  
Preliminary substance is available for the claim that it says something different  from ‘p’ – it speaks 
of a thinkable-entity and a property of truth neither of which are spoken of by ‘p’.  But how 
something more?  In the case of the singleton {a}, the claim that a’s being F explains {a}’s having a 
member which is F doesn’t come for free: it is grounded, rather, in the theory of sets and their 
membership.  This is what accounts for the ‘saying more than’ explanatory relation.  And no more 
can it come for free that a’s being F explains the proposition-entity that a is F’s having the property 
of truth.  For that, it seems, we shall need (nothing less than) a theory of propositions and their 
truth. 
One point of concern, then, might be that it’s unclear what sort of theory Hornsby could 
offer here.  She can’t suggest that the truth of the proposition that a is F depends upon a’s being F 
by virtue of its representing that a is F, as this is obviously incompatible with the identity theory.  To 
repeat a point made above, thinkables are not representations, they are what representations 
represent – facts.  (The proposition that a is F does not represent that a is F – it is that a is F.)  Nor 
can Hornsby make the dependence in some way definitional – not without, that is, her theory of 
truth collapsing into a minimalism.  (And Hornsby is quite clear she doesn’t want that: like Frege, 
Wittgenstein, Ramsey and many others, she is adamant that the notion of thought, of thinking and 
of thinkable, is not theoretically prior to that of truth.11)  What Hornsby would point us to here 
instead, I rather take it, is the work of Davidson.  I can’t begin here to assess the prospects of such an 
appeal.  What I want rather to do is query the fact that Hornsby so much as needs a theory, of 
whatever sort, of the truth of propositions.  The concern I want to press, this is to say, is not that it is 
unclear what Hornsby might say at this point but rather that we have here a point at which 
something needs to be said. 
 
5.4 
In adopting the identity theory and rejecting of the correspondence theory, Hornsby, following 
McDowell and Wittgenstein, wants to insist that thought and reality are internally connected.  To 
repeat the (retrospecting) later Wittgenstein: ‘When we say, when we mean, that something is the 
case, we do not stop with what we mean anywhere short of the fact’ (Wittgenstein 1953 §95).  Now 
Hornsby has that perfectly well, but the way in which she has it – the conceptions of meaning and 
fact she brings there into play – causes a second internal connection between thought and reality to 
become obscure.   How is it, the question opens up, that the truth of my judgment that Jack loves Jill 
is a matter of Jack’s loving Jill?  The response to this question in keeping with the Identity Theorist’s 
attitude towards truth should be that we have here mere truism: for my judgment to be a judgment 
that Jack loves Jill just is for its truth to be constitutively explained by Jack’s loving Jill.  Hornsby, the 
concern however is, is out of position to make such a response.  For my judgment to be a judgment 
that Jack loves Jill, she holds, is for it to have as its object the proposition-entity that Jack loves Jill – 
and it remains obscure, a point in need of substantial account, how the truth of that entity and so 
the truth of the judgment will depend upon things being a certain way with Jack and Jill.  McDowell 
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claims, and indeed attributes the claim to Hornsby, that ‘the only general statements we can 
acceptably make about truth are truistic’ (McDowell 2005 p88) – but Hornsby must, I think, refuse 
the attribution.  Her theorising leaves her needing to make and justify a substantial – non-truistic – 
theoretical claim that if the thinkable that p is true this is because p. 
We can voice the concern here with the terminology of gaps.  Hornsby’s identification of 
true thinkables and facts aims to repudiate the correspondence theorist’s idea of a gap between 
thought and reality.  But the manner of her identification effectively opens up a second such gap.  
This second gap is, if you like, a gap in the first instance within reality.  In having thinkables as things, 
Hornsby places them alongside, and so at a distance from, other, more normal things such as Jack 
and Jill.  In so having thinkables, this is to say, there arises a question of how matters being as they 
are with the thinkable-things – in particular their being true and their entailing each other –  relates 
to matters being as they are with the non-thinkable things – their being red, loving each other etc..  
One needs a bridging theory.  And whilst the gap in need of a bridge is, as said, a gap in the first 
instance between two sections of reality, once the absence of a gap between thought and one of 
these sections – the world of thinkables – is made clear, what we are left with is a precisely gap 
between thought and the world of Jack and Jill.  Hornsby thus ends up looking rather like the 
correspondence theorist she wants to oppose.12, 13 
 
5.5 
The identity theory of truth, I am suggesting, cannot find its proper expression until the dual relation 
theory of judgment is rejected; only then can the identity theorist have thought answerable to 
reality without therewith opening up a gap between the two.  And once the dual relation theory is 
rejected the identity theorist can indeed have gapless answerability.  Once the dual relation theory is 
rejected and thinkables conceived of as ways things may be, no separation is effected between 
thinkables and Jack and Jill.  Rather, Hornsby’s world of thinkables is replaced by Wittgenstein’s 
logical space of possibilities, and the layout of her world of thinkables becomes the determination of 
that space – it becomes, that is to say, nothing other than the layout of the world of Jack and Jill.14  
To repeat the point: once the dual relation theory is rejected, the claim that the truth of my 
judgment is explained by Jack’s loving Jill can become mere truism.  To say that a judgment has that 
Jack loves Jill as its truth condition – to say that it is a judgment that Jack loves Jill – is, trivially, to say 
that the obtaining of that condition constitutively explains the truth of the judgment.  And to say 
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 One perspective on the point here, misleading no doubt for certain purposes, would be that Hornsby has not 
so much avoided a gap between thought and reality so much as located thinkables on the thought side of such 
a gap – and so undermined her right to think of (true) thinkables as facts. 
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 Hornsby might reply that I’m running together here two types of gap, that the ‘ontological gap’ she wants to 
avoid between thought and the world is a particular kind of theoretical gap, and that the theoretical gap I’m 
finding her committed to is not of the same kind.  Maybe.  Certain things she says in her 1997 paper seem to 
suggest that she sees the correspondence theorist’s gap as between the conceptual (thought) and the non-
conceptual (world).  And the gap I’ve got in view is certainly not of this kind: the proposition’s truth is 
explained for Hornsby not by things being as they are with non-conceptual grit but rather by the proposition 
itself.  It is readily pointed out, though, that whilst some correspondence theorists clearly are operating with 
such a gap (e.g. Travis (2011)), others (e.g. the 1910 Russell) are clearly not.  And what the identity theorist 
should be after – surely – is a repudiation of the disunity of thought and world found in correspondence 
theories generally.  (This is I think McDowell’s ambition; it is certainly the early Wittgenstein’s (see Sullivan 
2001).) 
14
 For an account of the lack of a gap between thought and reality in the Tractatus, and of Wittgenstein’s 
attitude towards Frege on the matter, see Sullivan 2001. 
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this, for Ramsey, is not to say anything other than that Jack’s loving Jill constitutively explains the 
truth of the judgment.  The obtaining of the truth condition that Jack loves Jill is not the possession 
by some thinkable entity of the property of truth/obtaining: it is nothing other than Jack’s loving 
Jill.15 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
It is well known that Russell moves in 1910 not only to a multiple relation theory of judgment but 
also to a correspondence theory of truth.  We have explored the reasons he gives for adopting the 
multiple relation theory.  It’s not the case, however, that Russell advances further reasons, reasons 
beyond his concerns with thought’s answerability to reality, to justify his move to a correspondence 
theory.  On the contrary, the correspondence theory, Russell implies, is where one is taken when 
one takes such answerability seriously.  So immediately after saying that his earlier theorising ‘leaves 
the difference between truth and falsehood quite inexplicable’ he writes: 
 
We feel that when we judge truly some entity “corresponding” in some way to our judgment 
is to be found outside our judgment, while when we judge falsely there is no such 
“corresponding” entity.  (Russell 1992 p119) 
 
Wittgenstein and Ramsey disagree that this is the proper terminus of Russell’s concerns with 
answerability.  What those concerns call for is only a rejection of the dual relation theory of 
judgment; they do not in addition provide pressure for a correspondence theory of truth.  Russell’s 
‘feeling’ that for Jack to love Jill is for there to exist a fact-entity of Jack’s loving Jill is an entirely 
separable and somewhat dubious consideration.  Dubious or not, I have argued that the feeling is at 
least separable.  Once the dual relation theory is rejected, an identity theorist of truth can endorse 
perfectly well the claim that if my belief is true this is because of the content of reality. 
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